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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-1373 
_____________ 
 
HOLIDAY VILLAGE EAST HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATION, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
QBE INS CORPORATION; QBE INSURANCE GROUP, LTD.;  
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION UNDERWRITERS OF AMERICA. 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No. 1-11-cv-05765) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph E. Irenas 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 17, 2012 
_____________ 
 
BEFORE:  McKEE, Chief Judge, and SLOVITER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  April 22, 2013) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________ 
 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
Holiday Village East Home Owners Association, Inc. (“HVE”) appeals the 
District Court’s order denying relief to alter or amend a grant of final judgment, and 
2 
 
denying leave to file a second amended complaint.  For the reasons discussed below, we 
will affirm.
1
 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we only 
briefly recite essential facts. 
In its well-reasoned December 19, 2011 and January 25, 2012 opinions, the 
District Court explained why HVE’s amended complaint failed to state a claim, and why 
final judgment was warranted.
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After HVE’s amended complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), HVE sought reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) 
and 60(b)(1), and leave to file a second amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15(a).  Both motions were denied, and this appeal followed.
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II. 
                                              
1
  HVE’s appeal encompasses the District Court’s underlying ruling on the merits of 
HVE’s claims for declaratory relief and damages.  See, e.g., Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 
1406, 1414 (3d Cir. 1993) (reviewing the merits of appellant’s underlying claim on an 
appeal from a district court’s denial of leave to amend based on, inter alia, futility). 
 
2
  References to QBE include QBE’s corporate affiliates that were also named 
defendants. 
 
3  “We exercise plenary review [over] the District Court[’s] grant of a motion to dismiss 
under Federal Rule[] of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The District Court’s denial of a motion 
to amend pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  We review the District Court denial of a Rule 59(e) motion to amend the 
complaint for abuse of discretion, but we review the District Court’s underlying legal 
determinations de novo and factual determinations for clear error.”  Burtch v. Milberg 
Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted); see also 
Winer Family Trust v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 325 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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Contrary to HVE’s contentions, the District Court properly found that the Policy’s 
use of the present tense merely described what had to occur “abruptly” in order to merit 
coverage under the Policy’s collapse provision.  See Holiday Village East Home Owners 
Association, Inc , 830 F. Supp. 24, 27 (D.N.J. 2011), and 803 F. Supp.2d 28, 30 (D.N.J. 
2012) (denying motions to amend judgment and file second amended complaint); see 
also Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 103-104 (N.J. 2009) (noting that 
insurance policy provisions are interpreted as a whole rather than in isolation).  
Furthermore, the word “abrupt,” along with the Policy’s disclaimer of coverage even if 
the “building has been declared . . . to be in an imminent state of collapse,” narrows the 
meaning of “collapse” under the Policy by limiting coverage to an immediate, rather than 
gradual, collapse.  “[A]brupt” also distinguishes this case from Ercolani v. Excelsior 
Insurance Co., 830 F.2d 31, 34-35 (3d Cir. 1987), which held that there was coverage 
under an ambiguous contract provision that did not expressly limit coverage to immediate 
incidents.  Thus, because the Policy’s “collapse” provision unambiguously excludes 
coverage for HVE’s claim, there was no basis for the District Court to find that HVE 
stated, or can state, a claim for relief.  See President v. Jenkins, 180 N.J. 550, 562 (N.J. 
2004) (“If the policy terms are clear, courts should interpret the policy as written and 
avoid writing a better insurance policy than the one purchased.”).  Accordingly, HVE’s 
claims fail as a matter of law.
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4
   We also conclude that HVE’s contentions regarding the District Court’s interpretation 
of factual allegations, and application of pleading standards are without merit.  See 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009); Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 
(2007). 
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III. 
We will affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the District Court. 
